Stunt Driving

R v Drutz

Unreported

Her Majesty the Queen v. Alexandra Nicole Drutz

Court File No.: TB277579 (Central East Region – Newmarket)
Ontario Court of Justice — Justice Peter C. West | November 19, 2009

Background

Alexandra Nicole Drutz was charged with stunt driving under section 172 of the Highway Traffic Act after being caught driving 50 km/h or more over the speed limit on March 28, 2008. Under the province's new "stunt driving" regulations (Ontario Regulation 455/07), this qualified as an automatic stunt driving offence. The penalties were severe: a fine between $2,000-$10,000, potential imprisonment up to six months, immediate seven-day licence suspension, and seven-day vehicle impoundment.

Rather than simply fighting the charge, Drutz launched a constitutional challenge. She argued that the combination of section 172 and the regulation created an "absolute liability" offence that violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She also sought costs under section 24(1) of the Charter for the seizure and detention of her vehicle.

Issues

1. Did the combination of section 172 of the HTA and section 3(7) of Ontario Regulation 455/07 create an unconstitutional absolute liability offence?
2. Did the automatic vehicle seizure and detention violate section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure?

The Absolute Liability Analysis

Justice West applied the Supreme Court's test from R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie to determine whether this was an absolute liability offence. He examined four factors: the overall regulatory scheme, the subject matter, the penalty, and the precision of language used. The court found that driving 50+ km/h over the speed limit was essentially a speeding offence "by a different name" — the conduct was identical to existing speeding provisions in section 128 of the HTA.

Crucially, the court determined that no defence of due diligence was realistically available. As Justice West noted, "it is simply not realistic to say that a person could reasonably advance a defence that they did not know they were speeding when they would have to have been travelling 50 percent above the speed limit." The language of section 3(7) was identical to speeding provisions that courts had already deemed absolute liability offences.

The potential six-month jail sentence for what was essentially a speeding offence violated section 7 of the Charter. The court declared section 3(7) of the regulation unconstitutional and struck it down completely, dismissing the charge against Drutz.

Key Takeaway

Absolute liability offences that can result in imprisonment violate the Charter — even when they're disguised as "public safety" measures.

This case shows that creative legal challenges can succeed when governments overreach in their penalty structures. However, the Crown appealed this decision, and the specific regulation may have been amended since 2009, so current stunt driving laws may differ significantly.

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R v Kalijundic

[2008] O.J. No. 4749

R. v. Kalijundic

[2008] O.J. No. 4749
Ontario Court of Justice — P.J. Hiscox J.P. | September 8, 2008

Background

Tristan Kalijundic, a novice driver with a novice licence, was practicing his motorcycle skills on Highway 115. While driving at 70 km/h, a police cruiser pulled up behind him — just five metres back, barely more than a car length. The close proximity made Kalijundic nervous, and he made a driving error: he geared down but forgot to let off the gas and disengaged the clutch. This mistake caused the front tire of his motorcycle to lift off the ground — what's commonly called a wheelie.

The officer observed the front wheel come up (estimating 12 inches, while Kalijundic said it was only 6 inches). Kalijundic immediately stopped, was polite and cooperative with the officer, and was charged under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for stunt driving. The Crown had to prove that Kalijundic intentionally performed a stunt by lifting his motorcycle's tire.

Issues

1. What constitutes "stunt driving" under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act?
2. Does stunt driving require intention to perform the stunt?

The Intention Requirement

Justice Hiscox carefully analyzed the wording of section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, noting that it contains three distinct prohibitions: racing or contests, performing stunts, and driving on bets or wagers. The court found that the definition of "stunt" in the regulations specifically includes "an intention to lift some or all of its tires." This intention requirement was crucial to the case.

The judge accepted Kalijundic's evidence that the wheelie was accidental — a result of nervousness and inexperience, not any deliberate attempt to show off. Justice Hiscox contrasted this with the "cowboys" he had personally seen on Highway 115 who intentionally perform wheelstands at 100+ km/h for distances of two to three kilometres. In those cases, intention would be obvious. Here, the court was satisfied that Kalijundic had no intention whatsoever to lift his tire.

Key Takeaway

Stunt driving under section 172(1) requires proof of intention — accidents don't count, even if they look impressive.

If you're charged with stunt driving for something like an accidental wheelie, burnout, or tire lift, focus your defence on the lack of intention. The Crown must prove you meant to do it, not just that it happened.

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R v Raham

Unreported (Ont. C.J., September 4, 2009)

R. v. Raham

[2009] ONCJ (Court File No. 2011-999-08-0190-99)
Ontario Court of Justice — Justice G.J. Griffin | Heard July 23, 2009, Judgment September 4, 2009

Background

Jane Raham, a 62-year-old grandmother, was driving home to Oakville from Kanata where her daughter had just given birth to twins. She chose Highway 7 over the 401 because she feared being in the blind spot of big trucks. When she found herself behind a tractor-trailer doing 90 km/h in an 80 zone, she pulled into the oncoming lane to pass. The truck seemed to speed up as she passed, and "out of a sort of fear reaction" she accelerated to get safely back into her lane.

OPP Officer Doolan, following in an unmarked car with radar, clocked her at 131 km/h — 51 km/h over the limit. Under Ontario's new stunt driving law, that meant an immediate roadside licence suspension, vehicle impoundment, and a charge under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. Raham was convicted and fined $1,000, but her lawyer argued the law was unconstitutional.

Issues

1. Is stunt driving by excessive speed (section 3(7) of Ontario Regulation 455/07) an absolute liability or strict liability offence?
2. If it's absolute liability, does allowing imprisonment for up to six months violate section 7 of the Charter?

The Constitutional Analysis

Justice Griffin applied the four-factor test from R. v. Sault Ste. Marie to classify the offence: overall regulatory pattern, subject matter, penalty, and precision of language. The court found these factors largely neutral, but focused on a crucial question — is the due diligence defence actually available?

The judge concluded it's "simply not realistic" for someone charged with going 50+ km/h over the limit to claim they didn't know they were speeding or that they took all reasonable care. At those speeds (at least 50% over any posted limit in Ontario), "the person would have to have some knowledge that they were speeding." Since no genuine due diligence defence exists, the offence must be classified as absolute liability — not strict liability as the Justice of the Peace had ruled.

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), "absolute liability and imprisonment cannot be combined." Since section 172(2) allows up to six months in jail, the law violates section 7 of the Charter and cannot be saved under section 1.

Key Takeaway

Ontario's stunt driving law for excessive speed is unconstitutional because it allows jail time for an absolute liability offence.

This decision gives defendants a powerful Charter argument, though it only applies to the speed-based definition in section 3(7) of the regulation. The immediate roadside penalties and fines remain valid — only the possibility of imprisonment violates the Charter.

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R v Rahan [2010] ONCA 0206

[2010] ONCA 0206

No summary has been written for this decision yet.

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R v Silva

2010 ONCJ 121

R. v. Silva

2010 ONCJ 121
Ontario Court of Justice — Justice of the Peace Kenneth W. Dechert | March 31, 2010

Background

On October 9, 2008, Rui Silva was riding his motorcycle on North Service Road in Burlington when OPP Constable David Gruber spotted him from Highway 403. The officer observed Silva's motorcycle traveling eastbound with its front wheel approximately two feet off the ground for about 30 feet and several seconds. Silva had only owned his motorcycle for 2-3 months and held a one-week-old M1 learner's permit — essentially a beginner's license for motorcyclists.

When stopped, Silva immediately explained "Yeah, my clutch stuck." He was charged under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for stunt driving, specifically "driving a motorcycle with only one wheel in contact with the ground" as defined in Ontario Regulation 455/07.

Issues

1. Is stunt driving under section 172(1) a strict liability offence or does it require proof of intent?
2. Did the prosecution prove Silva intentionally performed the wheelie?

The Intent Requirement

This case hinged on a crucial legal interpretation. While most Highway Traffic Act offences are strict liability (you're guilty if you did it, regardless of intent), Justice Dechert ruled that stunt driving is different. The regulation defines a stunt as "driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to lift some or all of its tires from the surface of the highway." That word "intention" changes everything — it means the prosecution must prove the driver meant to do it.

Silva testified that he was an inexperienced rider who accidentally revved his engine while trying to shift from first to second gear. The gear got stuck in neutral, he panicked with traffic behind him, successfully shifted into second while the engine was still revved, and the sudden acceleration caused the unintentional wheelie. He immediately pulled in the clutch to bring the front wheel down.

The Credibility Analysis

Applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, Justice Dechert found both the officer and Silva to be credible witnesses. However, he didn't need to firmly believe Silva's version — he just needed to have reasonable doubt about whether Silva intended the wheelie. Given Silva's inexperience, his immediate explanation about the clutch, and the brief nature of the incident, the judge concluded he had reasonable doubt about Silva's intent.

Key Takeaway

Stunt driving charges require proof of intention — accidental wheelies don't count if you can prove it was unintentional.

This case shows that not all driving behaviours that look like stunts are actually stunt driving under the law. If you're charged with stunt driving, the prosecution must prove you intended to perform the stunt, not just that it happened.

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R v Sztronga

2010 ONCJ 157

R. v. Sztronga

2010 ONCJ 157
Ontario Court of Justice — Justice of the Peace Conacher | April 27, 2010

Background

On May 5, 2008, around 7:15 p.m., Colin Sztronga was riding his red Ducati motorcycle westbound on Highway 401 between Morningside Ave. and Markham Road. He was traveling with another motorcyclist on a Honda, both doing about 120-130 km/h in a 100 km/h zone. P.C. Proulx of Toronto Police Traffic Services was patrolling about 100 metres behind when he witnessed what he described as the "very distinctive red Ducati" pop a wheelie — lifting its front wheel off the roadway at a 45-degree angle for approximately 50 metres before passing the Honda.

Sztronga was charged under section 172 of the Highway Traffic Act for stunt driving, specifically for "driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to lift some or all of its tires from the surface of the highway." The penalty for this offence includes license suspension, vehicle impoundment, and substantial fines — making it one of the most serious sanctions under the HTA.

Issues

1. Whether the prosecution could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sztronga performed the wheelie
2. Whether the conduct, if proven, constituted stunt driving under Ontario Regulation 455/07

The Credibility Battle

This case came down to a classic "he said, he said" credibility contest. P.C. Proulx testified confidently that he saw the red Ducati perform the wheelie, while Sztronga claimed it was the Honda rider who did it. The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework: even if you don't believe the accused, you must still ask whether the Crown's evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge found several problems with Sztronga's testimony. He claimed to have observed the officer "at least 500 metres back" when emergency lights came on, but couldn't explain how he made such a precise distance calculation while riding at 120 km/h. He also testified about visibility problems from the setting sun, yet admitted to taking his eyes off the road to look backward. Most damaging was his claim that he "chased up to" the Honda to watch wheelies because they were "really cool" — undermining his assertion that he'd never attempt one himself.

The court found P.C. Proulx credible, noting his experience as a traffic officer, his detailed contemporaneous notes, and his unwavering testimony under cross-examination. The judge specifically rejected defence suggestions that the officer couldn't distinguish between the motorcycles or accurately observe from his position.

Strict Liability and Intent

The court classified stunt driving as a strict liability offence under R. v. Raham, meaning the Crown doesn't need to prove intent — only that the conduct occurred and that the manner of driving "indicates an intention" to lift the tires. The judge found this test was easily met: an experienced motorcyclist operating a $30,000 Ducati at highway speeds doesn't accidentally pop a wheelie. Given the road conditions, traffic volume, and Sztronga's admitted fascination with wheelies, the court concluded the manoeuvre was clearly intentional.

Key Takeaway

In credibility contests with police officers, courts will scrutinize every detail of your testimony for consistency and plausibility.

Sztronga's defence failed because his story contained implausible elements and his demeanour suggested he was being evasive about key details. When challenging police testimony, you need a coherent alternative narrative that doesn't contradict itself or defy common sense.

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