Red Light

R v James, Kirsten

No summary has been written for this decision yet.

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R v Kosch

[1998] O.J. No. 3512

R. v. Kosch

[1998] O.J. No. 3512
Ontario Court of Justice (Provincial Division) — Smith Prov. J. | June 24, 1998

Background

Eva Kosch was driving south on Main Street in Brampton on January 8, 1997, when she allegedly ran a red light at the intersection with Church Street. Her vehicle collided with another car, causing substantial damage to her van and a head injury to herself. A police officer in a Crimestoppers vehicle was sitting at the red light facing north and witnessed the collision, but couldn't investigate because police rules required a sergeant or above to handle accidents involving police vehicles.

Sergeant Paradis was called to investigate. By the time he arrived, Kosch had been taken to Peel Memorial Hospital. He went to the hospital, found her in a cubicle, and asked if she was driving the vehicle. She responded 'yeah.' Kosch was charged with failing to stop at a red light under the Provincial Offences Act. At trial, she didn't remember the accident due to her head injury and wasn't present in court — her agent defended the case.

Issues

1. Was Kosch's statement to Sergeant Paradis made voluntarily despite her head injury?
2. Did the Crown need to call Constable Stansbury, who spoke to Kosch at the accident scene?

The Voluntariness of Hospital Statements

The defence argued that Kosch's head injury meant her statement wasn't voluntary or made with an 'operating mind.' The trial judge held a voir dire and found the statement voluntary. On appeal, Smith Prov. J. upheld this finding, explaining that everyone is presumed to have an operating mind unless there's evidence suggesting otherwise — like being 'drunk standing there, falling down, wetting his pants, flailing about on the floor.'

The court found no evidence that Kosch was so badly injured that she couldn't understand what she was saying. While she had a head injury and was in pain, there was no proof she lacked mental capacity when she answered the sergeant's question. The Crown didn't need to prove she had an operating mind — the defence would need to prove she didn't.

Missing Police Officers

The defence also argued that the Crown should have called Constable Stansbury, who spoke to Kosch during her rescue from the vehicle. The court rejected this, citing the principle from R. v. Garfield that 'the prosecution is not obliged to call or to tender every witness who has had anything to do with an accused.' The Crown only needs to call officers who had 'investigative contact' with the accused. Since Stansbury couldn't investigate due to his rank and there was no evidence he questioned Kosch about the accident (only incidental conversation during rescue), his absence didn't affect the statement's admissibility.

Key Takeaway

A brief statement made while injured can still be voluntary if the person understood the question and could respond coherently.

Medical issues alone don't automatically make statements involuntary — courts look for evidence the person truly couldn't understand what was happening. Also, the Crown doesn't need to call every officer who was at the scene, only those who actually investigated or interrogated the accused.

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R v Langille

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R v Leveson

Unreported

R. v. Leveson

Ontario Court (Provincial Division), November 27, 1997
Ontario Court (Provincial Division) — Judge E. Earle-Renton | November 27, 1997

Background

Puimei Leveson was charged under section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to stop for a red light. The collision occurred when Mr. Mulchan was turning left on a green light and was struck by Leveson's vehicle coming from his left. Mulchan testified that his light was green when he entered the intersection, but crucially, he never said what colour the light was for northbound traffic (Leveson's direction).

The investigating officer, Mr. Tam, testified that he had an opportunity to inspect the traffic lights at the intersection and found them to be "functioning properly." However, when pressed on cross-examination about what "functioning properly" actually meant, the officer could not specify the actual colour sequence or timing of the lights.

Issues

1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Leveson's light was red?
2. Can a court take judicial notice that when lights are "functioning properly," one direction being green means the other is red?

The "Functioning Properly" Problem

The defence argued that the officer's vague statement about lights "functioning properly" was insufficient proof that Leveson's light was actually red. The Crown attempted to argue that the court should take judicial notice that if one direction has a green light, the perpendicular direction must have a red light.

Judge Earle-Renton rejected the Crown's judicial notice argument, noting the complexity of modern traffic intersections: "There are so many variations and combinations. It would not have been difficult for the Crown's witness, had the question been put to him or her to establish the actual functioning of the lights at this particular intersection."

The judge distinguished this case from a recent Brampton decision (R. v. Newton) where Judge Flaherty had accepted judicial notice of light functioning, stating that such a broad judicial notice principle was inappropriate given the variety of traffic light systems, including multi-phase lights, advance green arrows, right-turn-on-red permissions, and sensor-activated systems.

Key Takeaway

Vague police testimony about traffic lights "working properly" is not enough to prove a red light violation.

The Crown must provide specific evidence about what the lights were actually showing, not just assume that "functioning properly" means a simple two-way red/green system. This case shows the importance of challenging vague police testimony and demanding specific, detailed evidence of the alleged violation.

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R v McCoy

[2004] O.J. No. 6224

R. v. McCoy

[2004] O.J. No. 6224
Ontario Court of Justice — F.L. Forsyth J. | December 3, 2004

Background

Blake McCoy was driving southbound on Brant Street in Burlington when he passed through an intersection. A police officer positioned at the same intersection, but facing northbound, observed that his northbound traffic light was red. The officer concluded that McCoy must have run a red light and charged him under section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act. McCoy maintained that his southbound light was green when he proceeded through the intersection. The officer never actually saw the southbound light that McCoy was facing — he simply assumed it must have been red because his northbound light was red.

At trial, the officer testified that it was his "usual practice" to return to intersections after issuing red light tickets to check that the lights were functioning properly. He claimed he had done this after charging McCoy and found the lights working correctly. However, he had made no notes about this check and couldn't explain what "functioning properly" actually meant or what his inspection involved.

Issues

1. Can a court take judicial notice that opposing traffic lights function in synchronized fashion?
2. What evidence is required to prove traffic lights were functioning correctly at the time of an alleged offence?

The Evidentiary Foundation Problem

Justice Forsyth identified multiple fatal gaps in the Crown's case. First, there was no evidence about how these specific traffic lights were designed to function — no proof that when the northbound light was red, the southbound light would necessarily also be red. Second, there was no reliable evidence that the lights were actually working correctly on the date and time in question. The officer's testimony about his "usual practice" of checking lights was undermined by his complete lack of notes and inability to explain what such a check involved.

The court referenced R. v. Newton [1996] O.J. No. 5360, where Justice Flaherty established that courts cannot take judicial notice of how machines function. Justice Forsyth agreed, noting that "the functioning of traffic control lights is not self-evident." The Crown must prove through proper evidence that the lights were working as intended, not simply assume it based on how one directional light appeared to an officer.

Most critically, the Justice of the Peace at trial had improperly taken judicial notice that opposing traffic lights must be synchronized — exactly the kind of assumption about machine functioning that the law prohibits. Without this improper assumption, there was no evidence McCoy had actually faced a red light.

Key Takeaway

The Crown must prove traffic lights were functioning correctly with actual evidence, not assumptions about how traffic signals work.

If you're charged with running a red light, challenge whether there's proper evidence about the light's functioning and design. Officers who rely on "usual practice" without notes or specific testimony about what they observed have not met the required evidentiary standard.

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R v Newton

Unreported

R. v. Newton

[1996] O.J. No. 5360
Ontario Court of Justice (Provincial Division) — Flaherty Prov. J. | August 30, 1996

Background

Robert Newton was charged with failing to stop at a red light. The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence rather than direct observation of the traffic light when Newton allegedly ran it. There was evidence that the light for westbound traffic was green and had been green for some time when Newton's vehicle entered the intersection traveling northbound. The Crown also presented evidence that at the time Newton entered the intersection, the light facing southbound traffic was green.

To prove their case, the Crown relied on witness testimony from earlier and later the same day (or possibly the previous day) showing that someone had observed the intersection's normal functioning. The prosecution's theory was that if westbound traffic had a green light, then northbound traffic would automatically have a red light, requiring vehicles to stop.

Issues

1. Can a court take judicial notice of how traffic lights function?
2. Is circumstantial evidence about traffic light timing sufficient to prove a red light violation?

The Evidence Problem

Justice Flaherty identified the fatal flaw in the Crown's case: "There is no direct evidence as to what colour the light facing the defendant was at the time he entered the intersection." While everyone might assume that traffic lights work in a predictable pattern — green for one direction means red for the perpendicular direction — the court cannot simply take judicial notice of how a machine functions.

The judge noted that "anybody would have had to say is that when there is a green light westbound there is automatically a red light northbound so that traffic would have to stop and that is the way the lights are designed to work, but nobody said that." This missing piece of evidence proved crucial. The Crown needed someone to actually testify about how this specific intersection's traffic lights were programmed to operate.

Even with evidence of the light's operation at other times, and logical inferences about traffic light timing, the court ruled that "the threshold was never reached" to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Newton faced a red light.

Key Takeaway

The prosecution must prove every element of a traffic violation with actual evidence, not assumptions about how things "should" work.

If you're facing a red light ticket, examine whether the Crown has direct evidence of what color the light actually was when you entered the intersection. Circumstantial evidence and logical assumptions about traffic light timing may not be enough to convict.

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R v Yanitsky

2009 ONCJ 581

R. v. Yanitsky

2009 ONCJ 581
Ontario Court of Justice — Justice of the Peace Kenneth W. Dechert | November 27, 2009

Background

On January 31, 2009, at 10:20 p.m., Tatiana Yanitsky was driving with her husband to visit friends in an unfamiliar area of Oakville. After leaving their friends' house on Mayla Drive, she made a wrong turn and found herself going the wrong direction on Upper Middle Road. Looking for a way to turn around, she approached the intersection of Upper Middle Road and Neyagawa Boulevard and decided to make a U-turn at the traffic light.

Sergeant Lina Crawford of Halton Regional Police was driving eastbound on Upper Middle Road when she observed what she believed was a vehicle making a left turn from southbound Neyagawa Boulevard onto eastbound Upper Middle Road — while facing a red light. She followed the vehicle, pulled it over, and charged Yanitsky with "red light — proceed before green" under section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Issues

1. Did Yanitsky proceed through the intersection while facing a red traffic signal?
2. Was Yanitsky travelling southbound on Neyagawa Boulevard (as the officer claimed) or making a U-turn from westbound Upper Middle Road (as she claimed)?

The Credibility Contest

This case came down to a classic "he said, she said" situation with completely contradictory testimony. Yanitsky testified that she was travelling westbound in the left lane of Upper Middle Road, approached the intersection with a green light in her favour, and made a slow, cautious U-turn to head eastbound. She insisted she was never travelling southbound on Neyagawa Boulevard at any point.

Sergeant Crawford testified that she observed Yanitsky's vehicle stationary in the southbound lane of Neyagawa Boulevard, facing a red light, before making a left turn onto eastbound Upper Middle Road. However, the officer's evidence had some significant gaps — she couldn't specify exactly where the vehicle was positioned relative to stop lines or crosswalks, and her observations were made from approximately 100 yards away.

Justice Dechert applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility in cases with conflicting testimony. While he found both witnesses generally credible, he noted that the defendant's evidence was supported by a Google map she had marked with her route the day after the incident, when the events were fresh in her memory.

Key Takeaway

Even credible prosecution evidence can fail if it lacks sufficient detail about crucial elements of the offence.

The officer's inability to specify the defendant's exact position when "stationary" and the distance from which observations were made created enough reasonable doubt to secure an acquittal, despite the officer being otherwise credible and experienced.

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