Follow too close

R v Bookman

Unreported

Steven Myles Bookman v. Her Majesty the Queen

County Court of the Judicial District of York
Judge Joseph Cornish | March 1978

Background

Steven Myles Bookman, a solicitor, was charged under section 105(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for following too closely. The incident occurred at 9:40 a.m. on November 9th, 1976, on Kipling Avenue between Princess Margaret Drive and Burnhamthorpe Road. Officer Joseph Krolewski, a veteran with twenty-two years of experience, testified that he followed Bookman driving a Cadillac for approximately one car length, with both vehicles travelling at about 35 miles per hour.

Bookman disputed the distance, claiming it was more like three car lengths. The officer estimated the actual distance separating the two cars was probably 20 to 25 feet. Judge Cornish noted he had "no fault to find with the officer's testimony" regarding the distance measurement.

Issues

1. What constitutes "following too closely" under section 105(1) of the Highway Traffic Act?
2. Can a subjective police officer opinion alone establish guilt for this offence?

The "Following Too Closely" Problem

Judge Cornish identified a fundamental flaw in the prosecution's case: the Highway Traffic Act contains no definition of what "following too closely" actually means. The judge noted there were no decided cases to help interpret these words, and more importantly, no tests, studies, tables, or equipment available to provide guidance on what distance should be maintained under various driving conditions.

The court emphasized that determining a safe following distance requires considering multiple factors: speed, brake condition, driver reaction time, visibility, road incline, and whether the highway is wet or dry. Without objective standards or expert evidence addressing these variables, the charge relied purely on the "subjective opinion of a police officer." Judge Cornish found this insufficient, even when that opinion came from an experienced officer.

Key Takeaway

Vague traffic laws that lack objective standards can be successfully challenged, even when police testimony is credible.

This case shows that sometimes the problem isn't the evidence — it's that the law itself is too unclear to enforce fairly. When a statute provides no guidance on what constitutes a violation, courts may find it impossible to convict even with solid police testimony.

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R v Ouseley

[1973] 1 OR 729

Regina v. Ouseley

[1973] 1 O.R. 729-730
Ontario Court of Appeal — Chief Justice Gale, McGillivray and Arnup JJ.A | January 10, 1973

Background

Ouseley was driving behind another vehicle when he rear-ended it. The lead vehicle had slowed down gradually and stopped just before impact. The road surface was icy and not in good condition. Ouseley told police: "I saw her brake ahead of me. I braked and started to skid and hit her." He was charged under section 105(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for following too closely — the section that says drivers can't follow "more closely than is reasonable and prudent having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic on and the conditions of the highway."

At trial, there was absolutely no evidence about how closely Ouseley had been following the other car at any time before the collision. The only evidence was the fact of the rear-end collision itself, Ouseley's statement about braking and skidding, and the icy road conditions. The trial judge acquitted Ouseley, and the Crown appealed to argue that a rear-end collision alone should be enough to prove following too closely.

Issues

1. Does a rear-end collision by itself establish a prima facie case that the accused was following too closely under section 105(1) of the Highway Traffic Act?

The Rear-End Collision Rule

The Crown's lawyer, Campbell, argued that every rear-end collision proves the driver was following too closely at the moment of impact — that "nothing more need be proved than the fact of the collision." The Court of Appeal firmly rejected this approach. Chief Justice Gale explained that this logic would mean that "on each occasion where a rear-end collision occurs, at some fleeting second, the following car committed an offence under s. 105(1)."

The court held that the collision itself "would sustain logical inferences other than that the respondent was following too closely." The collision could just as easily have been caused by inattention or excessive speed. Since Ouseley wasn't charged with careless driving, and there was "no evidence whatever as to the distance which separated the two cars until the actual impact," there was no basis for a conviction under the following-too-closely provision.

This is crucial for defendants: the Crown must prove you were actually following too closely, not just that a collision occurred. Road conditions, sudden stops, mechanical failures, or momentary inattention can all cause rear-end collisions without violating section 105(1).

Key Takeaway

A rear-end collision alone does not prove you were following too closely.

If you're charged with following too closely after a rear-end collision, demand that the Crown prove the actual following distance was unreasonable under the circumstances. The collision itself is not enough evidence — they need to show you were actually tailgating before the impact occurred.

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R v ROBBINS

No summary has been written for this decision yet.

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R v Yassine

[1995] O.J. No. 4738

No summary has been written for this decision yet.

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