Fail to Yield from Private Driveway

R v Hornstein

No summary has been written for this decision yet.

Read the decision

R v Hynes

Unreported

Her Majesty the Queen v. Andrew Hynes

Provincial Court (Criminal Division), Brampton
Judge B.E. MacPhee | July 17, 1990

Background

Andrew Hynes was charged under section 119(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after a collision while exiting a driveway. The facts were straightforward: Hynes was leaving a driveway to a small shopping plaza, attempting to make a left turn onto a busy street. He had crossed two lanes of traffic and stopped partially in the left-turn lane when another vehicle collided with him. The other driver had been stopped for several seconds behind other vehicles that had stopped to allow Hynes to exit the driveway.

The case hinged on the specific wording of section 119(1), which requires drivers to yield "so close that to enter would constitute an immediate hazard." Defense counsel argued that because Hynes had already crossed two lanes and was stopped in position, he hadn't violated the section. The Crown countered that traffic had to stop for Hynes, proving he created an immediate hazard.

Issues

1. Whether a driver who has already partially entered a highway can be convicted under section 119(1) HTA
2. Whether the fact that traffic stopped for the defendant proves an "immediate hazard" was created

The Timing Defense

Judge MacPhee focused on the precise timing of when the alleged offense occurred versus when the collision happened. The evidence showed Hynes had been stopped for "three or four seconds" in the left-turn lane before being hit. Defense counsel argued successfully that by the time of collision, Hynes was no longer "entering" the highway — he had already entered it and stopped.

The judge found this timing argument compelling, noting there was "a considerable time frame during which he accomplished moving from the roadway over to the left-hand lane." The court distinguished this case from Regina and Parrot, where the collision occurred during the actual entry process. Here, the collision happened after Hynes had completed crossing two lanes and positioned himself in the turn lane.

Crucially, the judge noted that while traffic did stop to allow Hynes to leave the driveway, this didn't automatically prove a section 119(1) violation. The offense requires that entering would constitute an immediate hazard — but once the entry is complete and the driver is positioned safely, the analysis changes.

Key Takeaway

Section 119(1) HTA violations must be proven at the moment of entry, not based on subsequent events.

If you're charged under section 119(1) after a driveway collision, examine the timing carefully. The Crown must prove the hazard existed when you were actually entering the highway, not after you've already positioned yourself in traffic. This case shows that successfully completing a lane change — even if traffic accommodated you — doesn't automatically prove you violated the section.

Read the decision

R v Parrott

Unreported

R. v. John Parrott

Provincial Offences Court Appeal
Provincial Offences Court — Judge G.L. Young | November 21, 1988, Brampton, Ontario

Background

John Parrott was charged under section 119(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and convicted at trial. The case involved an incident where Parrott allegedly made it through the first two lanes of traffic. During the appeal hearing, Crown prosecutor Mr. Nevins candidly admitted he had been involved in the original trial and recalled the particulars of what happened.

The Crown's case appeared to center around a van coming out from a driveway, but during the appeal, a critical weakness in the prosecution's evidence became apparent. As Mr. Nevins acknowledged to the court, "I don't think there ever was a sighting of the van coming out from that particular driveway. It was purely speculation at the trial."

Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported the conviction under section 119(1) of the HTA
2. Whether speculation rather than actual evidence was sufficient to prove the charge

The Speculation Problem

Judge Young identified a fundamental disconnect between the facts established at trial and the charge laid. The court noted that Parrott "made it through the first two lanes" but expressed difficulty "squaring that with what the charge was." More critically, the Crown prosecutor himself acknowledged the fatal flaw in the case: there was never any actual visual confirmation of the van emerging from the driveway.

This admission revealed that the conviction was based on speculation rather than proven facts. In criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings like Provincial Offences Act matters, the Crown must prove each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Speculation, no matter how reasonable it might seem, cannot substitute for actual evidence.

Key Takeaway

A conviction cannot stand when it's based on speculation rather than proven facts, even when the Crown prosecutor believes the charge was appropriate.

Self-represented defendants should carefully examine whether the prosecution has actual evidence for each element of the charge, or whether they're asking the court to fill in gaps with assumptions and speculation.

Read the decision